

I'm pleased to be with you. You are here, I assume, in Washington because you want to get some information. You want to find out what the Congress is like, how it runs, how the government of the United States operates. You have a wonderful opportunity to do that; you'll have access to a lot of important people; you'll have access to the floor or to the galleries of the chambers of our Congress; you'll have access to newspapers, documents, histories. Before the summer is over, you should be able to form your own judgment as to how well our Congress operates and what you and other private citizens can do to support our government better.

Have you thought about the President, his Cabinet, the members of Congress? How do they gain the information to make the judgments that they have to make? Many of those judgments concern what we call closed societies around the world, countries where you cannot go and talk to the legislators, meet equally. Where you cannot read the paper and believe it. Where you cannot find documentary evidence as to what the government is doing, or even read meaningful histories in some countries. And yet, those people must make difficult decisions for our country with long term impact on you and me. How do they do it? They must get good information somehow on these closed societies. And if you don't think they are closed, remember a couple of instances--in 1972 what we know as the great wheat steal. When the Soviet Union unexpectedly, and without announcement, entered the world grain market on a large scale. And what happened, it drove the price of grain up and cost all of us as taxpayers

Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003000210001-9
in this country a lot because they did not publish simple economic statistics that most countries do publish and thereby caught us by surprise.

We have to be well informed if we are going to protect our interests. Look today, you are here at an exciting time as the Congress, on the 9th of July, begins its debate on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Do we want to have a treaty in which we are dependent upon the Soviets telling us that they are going to cheat? I don't think so. And yet, there is that danger when you sign a treaty like this. And so we must have good intelligence information about what is going on. Not only how many missiles in these holes over here or there, but what is the attitude, the approach to foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Is it changing, is it evolving, is it becoming more or less inimical to our national interests. And for that, because it is a closed society, you need a good intelligence organization.

What is the intelligence organization of the United States? It is spread over a lot of departments, a lot of agencies in our government. The principle ones are the Defense Department, with its military intelligence activities; the State Department that collects diplomatic intelligence information; the Department of Energy which looks into foreign energy developments; the Federal Bureau of Investigation which looks into the spying activities of other countries inside the United States, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the only organization of our government dedicated exclusively to the intelligence function.

How do these various agencies work? Well, first of all they collect information, and there are two generic types of collection. One is what we call technical collection and the other is human. Technical means you, on one hand, may use a photograph from a satellite from an airplane, or, on the other hand you may do what we call signals intercept. Right in this room right now there are signals passing through the airwaves. You turn on your portable radio you would get a reception, right. We intercept signals all around the world from ships and airplanes, ground stations, and so on. Some of them are military signals, some of them are communications signals. But they give us intelligence. There are a lot of other technical devices, infrared, radar and so on. They are one group of collecting activities for which this country is reknowned because of the technical sophistication of our industry and the capabilities we have here are burgeoning. Interestingly, however, they have by no means put out of business the second category the human intelligence activity which is a euphemism for a spy. For some reasons we spies don't like to call ourselves that.

You know when you get a photograph, or intercept a signal what does it tell you? It tells you about something that happened someplace sometime in the past. When you give that evidence to a policy maker like a Cabinet officer or a Congressman, he says, that is very interesting Stan but why did they do that? And what are they going to do tomorrow? And the way you penetrate and understand people's intentions, plans, thoughts, aspirations, be they individuals or nations is to go back to at least the bible days when the spy was the only way of collecting intelligence. So we still today are very dependent upon that.

sophistication on the technical side is to be able to bring it all together. This is somewhat new and it is unique because there is no other country in the world, except the Soviet Union that today has the full panoply of intelligence collection activities or capabilities that we do because they are very expensive. We must today be sure that when we see in a picture that somebody has built a new factory over here, we say, we wonder if that makes nuclear weapons and we say to the signals intercept people see whom the factory is communicating with. Is it the ministry of nuclear power or the ministry of education or whatever, and then when we narrow it down a little bit we say to the human intelligence people, get a spy now and to see what is going on in that ministry to find out if it correlates with that factory. That is just a hypothetical example, but it is that kind of teamwork which is the challenge before us.

It is a challenge because, as I am sure you are rapidly learning, this is a vast bureaucracy that we all work in. And with as many agencies and departments as I have described involved in the process they all have their own priorities, their own special interests it has got to be pulled together. That is my job not as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency but as the Director of Central Intelligence. A position created as far back as 1947 to bring together all of the diverse intelligence activities of our country. It happens the law also says that same person will be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, but they are two separate jobs.

What is the second thing that all of these agencies do? Well, it is to analyze, to piece together the information that is collected. This

Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003000210001-9

is really a research activity, much like that which is done on college campuses or in major industries in their research departments. You never, in intelligence, have the whole picture. You have a piece of the puzzle here and a piece of the puzzle there and you are trying to put them in enough of the right order that you have a concept of the picture that is supposed to be there. You have to rely not on getting the whole picture however, but on your basic experience, on understanding trends, and then deduction. What can these three pieces of the puzzle tell us must be in that fourth one. And here interestingly--or as I emphasized in collection, bringing it together--I didn't mention that in addition to efficiency in finding out if that really is a nuclear weapons factory, we also have to bring it together because we don't want to take undue risks in the collection field. You certainly don't want to send that spy out if you could have gotten the information with a photograph.

But, interestingly, on the the analytic side, the research side, it is quite the opposite. We want duplication. We want, in a sense, inefficiency because the only way really to be fully efficient is to have divergent views coming forward on what the missing piece of the puzzle is. It is never so clear that you can count on this analyst or that analyst, or that agency, or that department to be sure they have overcome their individual biases and backgrounds in giving you as objective a view of the situation as possible. And that is, of course, our job. We are divorced in intelligence from policy making because we must try to give as unbiased a view as we can. Because if we get to trying to drive policy, then the intelligence will be subverted to that purpose rather than being objective.

And so, the State Department specializes in analyzing political intelligence and has a secondary capability in economics and a tertiary in military. The Pentagon with military specializes obviously in military intelligence with a secondary in political and a tertiary in economics. And the CIA tries to stay on top of all three and to be a devil's advocate, a source of checking on the others. And the CIA, incidentally, is the only one of these three, of all of the other agencies in intelligence, that does not play in a policy role. The intelligence elements of Defense and State do not work in the policy side of those departments, but nonetheless they are part of a policy making department. The Central Intelligence Agency has no such policy role and therefore is looked upon as sort of the super devil's advocate in this process, trying to keep everyone unbiased and honest.

You might well ask me at this point, how do we stack up with the Soviets in this kind of a business because we all know we have lots of inhibitions here but a country like the Soviet Union does not have. But let me tick them off. There is human intelligence, we're smaller but better. We go with a scalpel, they go with a meat cleaver. They've got a lot more spies around the world than we do. I'm not quite sure why because we publish most of it in Aviation Week or someplace. In technical intelligence collection, we are clearly ahead because of our sophistication in this country. On analyzing intelligence, I just have an abiding personal conviction that when you live in a free society where you invite debate and divergent views, where the Socratic dialogue is the kind of thing we love, you are going to have better analysis. When you are in a closed society of a totalitarian nature where, if your

Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003000210001-9
analysis comes up with the wrong answer, you may not have your job tomorrow. In short, I sincerely believe that the freedom of our society gives us an edge in the analytic side, in the interpretation of the facts over any totalitarian society. So, therefore, I believe on all three counts--collecting by human means, collecting by technical means, and analyzing the results--we are better and I intend that we stay that way.

Let me touch on three areas that we are dealing with the Congress today, and you individually may have some rub with these activities in your weeks ahead here on Capitol Hill. First is the SALT treaty. This will be an historic debate for this country. And as I said before, I think you are fortunate to be here and be in the midst of this and absorb the atmosphere and have some role in it as you work with your members of Congress. Because even though on the House side they don't actually vote on it, they do have an important role to play in keeping the country informed and being in touch with their constituents on it.

The role of the Intelligence Community is to be objective with respect to what we can do to check on Soviet behavior under the terms of the treaty and to estimate the possibility that the Soviets will try to violate the treaty. It is not our position to try to determine whether it is a good treaty or a bad treaty, or whether we can adequately guard the treaty. We can tell the Congress and will tell the Congress in great detail on a classified basis, how well we can check. But with a complicated treaty like this, you can't have a 99 or 100 percent certainty on checking on anything. So the question of what is good

Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003000210001-9
enough has got to be melded in with lots of policy issues like how

strong is our defense effort, how much can we respond quickly if we found they were cheating and so on, which are issues for the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. But we will make an objective contribution in telling the Senate specifically how well we believe we could do under various circumstances that could develop under this treaty. It is an important, challenging and exciting task.

Secondly, there is floating around in the Senate right now a proposal for Congressional charters for the Intelligence Community of our country. Our charter, so to speak, today is a law of 1947 amended in 1949 is, quite frankly, out of date, out of tune with what the country wants and expects from its intelligence activities. The new charter, drafted originally by the Senate, with a counterproposal that has come out of the White House, lays out what we are expected to do, the authorities we are going to be given, and it lays out the parameters within which we must do that. What does the country expect of us, what degree of risk do they want us to take, and so on. I think this is very important, it is very important to update our basic instructions. It is unfair to the people of the Intelligence Community not to tell them what you want them to do and what we want them not to do. Yes, we've been criticized for doing things that the country in retrospect did not want us to do. Now I would like to lay down in a charter prospectively what the country expects us to do so we have clear guidance, because we want to conform to it. I hope those charters will pass in this Congress.

Closely related and a part of the charters is the third connection between intelligence and Capitol Hill that I would like to invite your

Capitol Hill in the last two years. And this is the process of oversight of the Intelligence Community. That too, I hope, will be spelled out in the charter, but it is already at work. We have had for over two years in the Senate, and not quite two years in the House, a committee in each chamber dedicated exclusively to overseeing the intelligence process. And I would like to say to you that these committees are really working splendidly. I hesitate to say that because somebody will assume then they are in my pocket, and that is not at all the case. Our relations with these committees are very good but it is definitely a supervisory relationship, an oversight relationship. I report to them. I'm called to task by them to respond. I personally go up there quite a bit and testify. Other people in the Community go up very frequently. The guidance we receive from them is helpful.

But most importantly, out of this oversight process we have established in this country more accountability of the intelligence activity than ever before in our history, and I believe ever before in the history of any country with a major intelligence organization. Out of this accountability is coming an intelligence process that lets us do our job and accept the risks that we must take for the country, but in an accountable manner and in one that ensures we are conforming with the laws, the standards, the attitudes of the people of this country. This is new, it is what I call a new model of American intelligence. It is one that is not perfected as yet, but it is a marvelous success story of how far we have come in the last two or two and a half years in this respect.

You have an opportunity while on Capitol Hill to play a part in looking at this intelligence charter process and looking at this intelligence oversight process, I think you too will be pleased and proud. It is important, it's exciting, it's a major development, it's a major experiment, but we are really moving well. I think we will be settled down and I can say to your successors' successors perhaps that we are there. We are not there yet. It is in a state of evolution but it is moving in the right direction.

Let me take your questions now and see what you've got on your minds.

- Q. Admiral, you stressed very highly the technical efficiency of the CIA, and indeed of the entire intelligence community. But recently you have come under criticism in your analytical phase, examples, being the Middle Eastern war of 1973, and the recent Iranian revolution. Do you feel it is proper to characterize the CIA as being deficient in these areas and what might you do to improve them.
- A. You can criticize us for our failure to predict the '73 war and the Iranian revolution. Are we doing enough to emphasize this side as opposed to the technical collection side of the house. I believe that on the analytic side of our activities--you have to ask yourself when dealing in this area what do the decision makers need and expect from us? What we are being criticized for in these two instances is that a month or two ahead of time we didn't predict what was going to happen in a war or a revolutionary situation and we would like to be able to predict those. We will try harder. If we had told the decision makers that was exactly what was going to happen, there wasn't much they could have done. What we are trying to do and I think doing quite well, is looking out and saying, boss here is something that is going to happen in 6 or 12 months, here are the trends in this part of the world or that country. That they can do something with, it is maleable. When it is down to the last crisis like the overthrow of the Shah, it is too late. We would like to be able to get in on that, but that is the most difficult part of the job.
- Q. Inaudible.
- A. Resignations and morale. Morale is definitely on its way up in the Central Intelligence Agency. It definitely was down and if you were in a profession, any profession that you worked in maybe for 10 or 20 years, you joined because it was what you understood to be a very honorable contribution to your country, a patriotic one and suddenly in 1975 you found your Agency all over the newspapers under great criticism and that continued for 3-4 years, your morale would be down too. I happen to have experienced that with respect to Vietnam in my previous military profession. But those people had an important job to do in the military, they had good people and they snapped back from it and I see that happening in the Central Intelligence Agency today. There is not a problem of resignations. You have got to appreciate that that Agency is now 32 years, that is sort of a generation of a working man's work. We are having people leave because they have been there 25 or 30 years and, in point of fact, the number of resignations so-called in that winter when it was played up in the press, was no more than it has been or only insignificantly more than it has been on the average in January of every year. The Press has, since 1975 decided to pick on us and they haven't quite quit.

Q. Inaudible.

A. No. No to both questions. What I did was pare the overhead of our Agency by 820 positions. That meant that a relatively few individuals actually went out the door, who didn't want to retire anyway and we didn't take any assets out of Iran or people who had expertise in Iran either.

Q. What do you think the extent of Soviet spying in the US is, and what do think of the chance that there is a Soviet spy in the room right now?

A. Soviet spying activities are very sensitive in our country. Interestingly, what you call spying is not accurate because a lot of their activity is dealing with unclassified information. One of the things they are after mostly is technology, they want to know how our industry runs so well and theirs so poorly. When you've got a country their size and you can't even feed yourself there's something wrong. They are going around the country trying to get technological information which is really not spying. There is a lot of spying going on, in addition, I think the FBI does a very good counter-intelligence job and we have thwarted a great deal of that, but we do know they are trying to listen in here in Washington to regular telephone circuits that are pumped over microwave. We have taken a lot of action to prevent that because we found out about it. So, there is no question of their sizeable effort.

Q. Inaudible.

A. Is the danger of leaks from the Oversight Committees damaging and what form could that damage take? Leaks from any source are damaging. I don't happen to believe that Congressmen are any more leaky than CIA people, or Defense people, or White House people or anyone else. If I can be totally candid with you, I would say that when leaks take place, they take place for different reasons. They take place in the Pentagon because they want to sell a new piece of military equipment. They take place from the White House because they want to sell a new policy. They take place from the State Department because they want to undercut a policy. They take place from the Congress because there are political axes to be ground. So you take a risk anytime you tell somebody something that it will leak under some circumstance. I happen to feel the Congress has been very responsible in this regard, and that it is worth it to have this oversight, this accountability to take additional risks with just the number of people expanded raises the possibility of leaks. But at the same time I would say that we have some instances-- the Congress passed the law in 1974 about what we call covert action, which I haven't really discussed, to try to influence events in other countries. We are required to report any planned covert action to 8 committees of the Congress and that is too much. That is expanding the leak potential further than is necessary for adequate oversight.

- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003000210001-9
- Q. Admiral why is the US intelligence community and the Administration continuing to insist that the Sandanista rebels in Nicaragua are communists without offering any public evidence other than the fact that a few of them were in Cuba in '74. And, if this evidence that they are communists, from weapons used, is it possible that this is direct transfer of weapons through 3rd parties of the black market of the world and what is your perspective on these public pronouncements of the communists--of the Sandinistas--what has the effect been on the Carter foreign policy of Latin America?
- A. That is a good question. How do we know that a Sandinista is a communist? How do we know where they are getting their weapons? What effect does the announcement that they are communist have on US foreign policy? I am not sure the intelligence community has made this pronouncement. Let me say that your question gets to a very fundamental problem. Through this oversight to the openness that we have espoused in intelligence in the last several years, we have encountered the problem that there are some things you cannot explain. Let's say I have a spy inside the Sandinista organization--which I am not saying--END OF SIDE A
.... about these newspaper people who have gone to jail because they were forced to decline to disclose their sources. We're in the same spot. Why do they want not to disclose their source? Because they won't be able to go back to him or her tomorrow. And the same way with us in the human intelligence field and even in the technical intelligence field. If we reveal the technical details of our systems or who our agents are, we're out of business. So there are questions like that that we honestly can't answer. I don't think anything we have said in this regard in any public way has warped American policy however.
- Q. Inaudible.
- A. There are two questions here. How serious is the loss of our listening posts in Iran and did we lose some equipment there that also was important to us? The answer to the second question is no. We're satisfied that we have not lost something of important value in terms of equipment. We left those places in an orderly manner. As far as the loss of the listening posts is concerned, any time when you lose a source of information it is injurious to your intelligence capabilities. At the same time, I believe we are very ingenious, we're capable of finding replacement ways, we are seldom, seldom dependent upon one source of information only and we strive very hard always to have secondary sources.
- Q. Inaudible.
- A. Do I think there will be a war in the Middle East soon? Well they apparently shot down five Syrian planes yesterday. It's hard to say--there's almost not a war going on there and has been, of course, an on and off war in Lebanon for a long time. Specifically to answer your real question of a major war, no I don't think so.

I think the Camp David accords, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, have enough momentum that we are not going to have a war. There are a lot of problems now and we're getting on to the next stages of that treaty, but I don't see that breaking up in war.

Q. Inaudible.

A. No. I'm really in a difficult position here. Anytime I say anything in public about SALT somebody misportrays it in the press and I'm suddenly the big anti-SALT fellow. Or if I answer the question a little differently, somebody will grab it and say that Turner is biased, he's trying to sell SALT. I'm not a SALT seller. I'll try to give you some pepper but no salt. Seriously, I will answer that question obviously to the Senate and in great detail as to what the degree of loss is and what the potential for recovery is and what its impact on the treaty is. These will be very tough questions and I just couldn't address them here without getting over my head with the press and without getting over my head in classified information.

Q. Inaudible.

A. Well, there is enough accuracy to fill up Agee's listing of CIA people, that it did serious damage to the Agency. If you, as I hope some of you will, join the CIA when you graduate from college or your post-graduate work, because there is not much more of an exciting opportunity in our government whether you are on the analytic side, whether you are on the human intelligence collection side. When you join us, if you do, you will be assigned perhaps overseas. You will be required, if you are in the undercover part of our business, not to acknowledge that you work in the CIA. Maybe in ten or fifteen years you will have a couple of children, they'll be travelling around with you and they'll start to ask and wonder, why doesn't daddy get to be the head man at whatever we're doing over here, he's always number two or three. Because he doesn't say he's in the CIA, he may be the head CIA man, but he's also got to be undercover doing something else. What I'm saying is you make a lot of sacrifice, you are building a career as a clandestine intelligence case officer. And suddenly along comes a man like Agee and you feel like somebody who has spent four years in medical school and how many years in internship and suddenly got in an automobile accident and lost his surgeon's right hand. Your career is truncated because of some traitorous SOB and I think that we ought to pass a law in this Congress, and we are proposing that, that inhibits people who have been given access to those names after taking the secrecy oath, realizing they were being given it not because you heard it on the street or a newspaper man picked it up. Somebody who was given that as a part of his job then disclosing it and hurting individuals, one of whose lives was lost because of Mr. Agee in our opinion. I think it is very, very sad and ought not to be tolerated by this country.

Q. Admiral Turner, intelligence works hand in hand with the military forces to keep our country strong. I would like to know what your opinions would be on having mandatory national service for women of this country.

A. Mandatory national service? I'm for it. I think my biggest hesitation with it is that we would have to create non-military opportunities for national service that were truly meaningful. I would be very concerned that the young people going into national service in the non-military mode would be disillusioned if they were given make-work things to do. There is so much that can be done for the poor, for the underprivileged educationally, for the handicapped. There must be a program that could be enacted. You're out of my experience as an intelligence officer but as an individual, I would like to see that and spread the responsibility across the entire populace rather than concentrating on those of you who accept it.

Q. Inaudible.

A. No, I really can't. We have the same old problem here. We use all of the intelligence activities I have described to you and almost all come into play in SALT. You really can't get into great detail.

Q. Admiral Turner, would you comment on the theory that the CIA was involved in the Kennedy assassination?

A. The theory that the CIA was involved in the Kennedy assassination. I can give you a sneak preview that the latest assassination committee is going to come out in a matter of days exonerating the CIA from any such connection. They have just had a big investigation of that and I have, in my two and a half years here, been able to find no evidence of any such connection.

Q. Inaudible.

A. Yes. That was a very unfortunate event. That is the first time since all these investigations of 1975 and 76 that we've been accused of doing something heinous like that I believe. Most of the things you read in the paper today have big headlines, "CIA Drugs People." Then you get on through the whole thing and in paragraph 17 it says, this took place in 1952. But this one happened in 1978 and there's no question it did happen. It was a very low-level individual who was a security guard. When we give very sensitive information to the Congress, we have rules under which we have to be sure it is kept under control because peoples' lives might be at risk. So we put a safe in their hearing rooms and put a guard on our safe and he gives it out to people who are authorized and makes sure that it doesn't get disseminated improperly. Unfortunately, this individual, in the same room with the Committee's safes, got curious about the autopsy pictures of President Kennedy and went over and started looking at them,

heard somebody coming, tried to cover his tracks and got in deeper and deeper and deeper. When I found out about it and was given the facts, I fired the man immediately. We have found no connection at all between him and anybody else in the Agency in this very improper activity. We are embarrassed by it, we're ashamed of it, but it was an individual mistake by one GS-5 employee and I am very sorry about it.

Q. Admiral, I'd like to talk about joining the CIA and would like to tell a brief story which will end with a question. A student at a university which I happened to be attending was recruited by the CIA and the CIA very much wanted him to join. But he didn't want to join and then his father died. Well, the CIA knew he was very close to his father and in the weeks following his father's death they came up with papers, forged papers, which told him his father had secretly been a CIA agent for his life. And they told the student that he should join the CIA then and continue in what his father's work had been. He did join and this story comes to me from Ward Halperin, a member of your Agency.

A. Oh no. He spends his whole time trying to subvert our Agency.

Q. My question is, in your opinion, does the end of national security justify where the means end of _____? Where do you draw the line on secrecy, on your clandestine activities, on deceptions in the name of the end of national security?

A. Well, that is a very good question, very philosophic and a difficult one to answer. Let me tell you categorically, absolutely categorically, the ends do not justify the means of using forged documents to deal with an American to recruit him into CIA. And I doubt that that was done and I'd like you to give me the name of the individual and I'll probe that to the bottom and if it was done, I'll fire the people. I've done that when I've found any malfeasance of any sort in the Agency. I have fired a few people who had done what I think is the limit on means justifying the ends. That is, I will not tolerate people deceiving each other inside the Central Intelligence Agency, inside the United States Government, because if I look at a fellow and know that he's deceived his superior, then I don't know why I have to expect his superior not to deceive me. And when I found that happened in a couple of small cases, and they were small, I just didn't brook it, and said you're gone. I happen to have that authority in government, very few other people do. I can dismiss people because of this sensitivity of the trust which we have from you. Now as to the broader question of when do the ends justify the means in intelligence collection, I can only say to you that there is no pat answer to that. I'm asking for charters from the Congress which will spell out some guidelines for us here so we have instructions, so that we're not quite so subject to retroactive morality if we do something today and it's looked at five years from now. But I also tell you that I face that issue, that question almost daily and it is a tough judgment. It's a

tough judgment to say how important is it to the President, the Cabinet, the Congress that we know this and at what cost. What cost in reputation to the country if we caught doing that. What cost to somebody's life if we try this and fail. I can only assure you it is not an easy task. It is not one for which there is a pat formula. Mr. Halperin's formula is don't do it. His formula is simply wait until the war starts and then go do all the dirty tricks. It's that simple, it's that foolish. But I'll tell you it isn't that simple. And I face those issues and I carry that responsibility and I do it for you in the best moral way that I can. You cannot come up with a written formula and say this is how has to be done. You've got to put people in the job you trust, you've got to give them responsibility and then you've got to hold them accountable and I'm ready to do that.

Q. Inaudible.

A. This question deals on covert action which I touched on only very briefly. It is the effort to influence events in foreign countries without it being known who is doing that influencing. It is a tool in the kit of foreign policy somewhere between diplomacy and war. It is a tool that has sparing usefulness today in my opinion. It is a tool that we should not forsake because it may be important to us at some time in the future, more important perhaps than it is today. It is useful today in some small ways, but if you knew all the covert actions that we are doing today you wouldn't be able to write a good spy novel. Covers? We'll continue the basic policy we have today under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 which the President must approve in writing on recommendation of the National Security Council and then I must notify eight committees of Congress, only we will recommend cutting that to two committees of Congress-- the two oversight committees. Because one of the reasons covert action is not useful today, is that if you can't keep it covert, you can't call it covert action. You can't do it if you're going to really spread it around too far. So in sum, we can continue the covert action process which today is very controlled, very regulated about like it is with just a limited dissemination on Capitol Hill. I really hope you enjoyed the rest of your summer here. The questions have been great. Good luck to you.

